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This thesis examines how welfare program implementation varies across states, and what 
those differences in implementation mean for welfare (TANF) recipients across the 
country. Specifically, I examine the extent to which state-level context related 
demographics and economics as well as political ideology, religious culture and race may 
contribute to contemporary disparate economic outcomes for low-income racial and 
ethnic minorities in the United States. This study relies on a sample of welfare recipients 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) during 1998-2013 to 
examine individual recipients’ average monthly TANF payments. Analyses combine 
SIPP data with state-level information drawn from several secondary sources including 
the Urban Institute, State Partisan Balance Database, U.S. Census Bureau and Religious 
Congregations and Membership Study. 
 
The study tests four distinct empirical hypotheses grounded in extant empirical literature 
as well as group threat theory. Results from a comparison of subclass mean differences 
and complex survey design adjusted OLS models support the hypotheses and indicate 
that state-level characteristics do influence individuals’ average monthly TANF 
payments.  Findings suggest that recipients in states with a more conservative political 
 
 
ideology, a larger percentage of African Americans, or a higher rate of Evangelicals will 
have lower average monthly TANF payments compared to recipients in more liberal 
states, states with a lower percentage of African Americans, or states with a lower rate of 
Evangelicals. In addition, a state’s percentage of African Americans interacts with other 
state-level characteristics to produce different estimated average monthly TANF 
payments based on states’ proportion of African Americans. The results support group 
threat theory as both white and black recipients receive lower average TANF payments in 
states with a higher percentage of African Americans. This raises questions about how 
social policies are implemented at the state level and to what extent state contextual 
factors shape social policies in a way that maintains existing systemic inequalities. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
As a recognized leader in the global economy, the United States has the fifth 
highest per capita gross domestic product (GDP) and the fourth highest per capita net 
national income among the 35-member countries of the OECD (OECD 2018b). 
Simultaneously, the United States is underperforming among the OECD countries 
regarding inequality measures. For example, in 2016, the United States had the second 
highest poverty gap ratio (0.400), defined as the proportion of people that fall below one-
half of the country’s median household income, and the sixth highest poverty rate (0.168) 
(OECD 2018a). The disparity in these results and other research suggests that despite the 
United States’ economic success, its social policies have not been as successful in 
reducing the poverty rate compared to other Western countries (Brady, Fullerton, and 
Cross 2009). 
Esping-Andersen (1990) classified the Western welfare states into three different 
types: social-democratic, corporatist, and liberal. The regimes are distinguished by their 
primary focus: the social-democratic regime focuses on equality of outcomes, the liberal 
regime focuses on market-driven outcomes, and the corporatist regime focuses on 
maintaining status differentials and traditional family roles. On one hand, the U.S. fits the 
description of a liberal welfare state well with its work-focused welfare policies. On the 
other hand, U.S. welfare policy is unique compared to other Western countries in that the 
eligibility requirements and benefit levels are determined at the state level, not the federal 
level (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001). U.S. states receive a set amount of federal 
funding governed by a few, but key, federal mandates including a lifetime limit on cash 
assistance of five years, meeting various caseload work participation requirements, and 
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restricting assistance to legal immigrants until they have resided in the U.S. for five years 
(CBPP 2016) . The states then develop their own independent welfare programs that can 
vary in the eligibility requirements, the types of benefits available, the level of benefits 
received, and the sanctions enforced for not meeting program guidelines.  
Differences in state government political ideology have been shown to affect the 
types of welfare programs implemented and the generosity in the level of benefits 
provided (Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss et al. 2001). While the political ideology of the 
state government representatives is important, the political ideology of the state citizens 
is influential as well. For example, Erikson, Wright and McIver (1993) found that states’ 
policies generally conform to the state citizens’ ideology through the influence of public 
opinion on party elites and state representatives. Prior research has looked at the effect of 
various levels of policy devolution, from federal to state and from state to more local 
oversight such as county or program administration (Fording, Soss, and Schram 2011, 
2007; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2008). However, the extent to which contextual state-
level characteristics result in a greater variation in individuals’ TANF cash assistance 
payments across states has yet to be fully examined. 
An additional ideological factor that has been shown to influence one’s views 
regarding social policy is religious belief (Brint and Abrutyn 2010; Steensland and 
Wright 2014). In the U.S., religious beliefs generally inform people’s views on the 
government’s role in helping the poor and those in some conservative Christian 
denominations believe the government does more harm than good (Pew Research Center 
2015).  
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Another unique factor of the U.S. welfare regime is that it developed under a 
highly racialized context that largely excluded African Americans and other racial/ethnic 
minorities from receiving assistance for much of the twentieth century. U.S. welfare 
policies have often disadvantaged African Americans resulting in explicit and latent 
discrimination (Katz 2013; Quadagno 1996; Schram, Soss, and Fording 2003). The 
legacy of slavery and Jim Crow left a disproportionate number of African Americans in 
deep poverty. Unable to access benefits since the beginning of federal welfare programs 
in the 1930s, African Americans were largely excluded from receiving benefits (Brown 
1999; Quadagno 1996). For example, from the 1930s to the 1960s African American 
mothers were denied benefits based on “suitable” household policy provisions (Gordon 
2011). During this same time, southern “black codes” excluded providing benefits during 
planting and harvest seasons so that low-income mothers would be more motivated to 
participate in the lowly paid agricultural workforce (Hall 2005; Steinberg 1990). After 
the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s, the narrative surrounding welfare became 
racialized through negative stereotypes and misleading media portrayals of African 
Americans as “welfare queens” taking advantage of the system (Abramovitz 2006). 
Several studies have identified disparities in the amount of benefits provided and the 
severity of program restrictions in the welfare programs of states with higher percentages 
of minority recipients both pre and post the major welfare reform in 1996 (Fording et al. 
2011; Quadagno 1996; Soss et al. 2001). This raises the question whether contemporary 
welfare policy implementation continues to contribute to broad racial disparities in the 
distribution of benefits and sanctions and how this affects individual TANF recipients.  
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Thus, the goal of this research project is to explore how state contextual factors 
affect individuals’ level of welfare benefits. The effects of political ideology, religious 
culture and race on the implementation of state welfare policies may contribute to 
contemporary disparate outcomes for economically disadvantaged racial and ethnic 
minorities in the United States (Fording et al. 2011; Schram et al. 2003). For instance, 
according to data from the 2015 U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Survey, the 
percentage of minority Americans that live below the federal poverty line (Blacks – 24%, 
Hispanics – 21%, Other – 14%) is higher compared to white Americans (9%) (KFF 
2016). In addition, a disproportionate number of welfare recipients identify as black 
(29.1%), Hispanic (36.9%), or as another non-white race/ethnicity (6.4%) (ACF 2016a).  
Research Question and Hypothesis 
This study seeks to understand how state-level characteristics are associated with 
individuals’ welfare benefits. Specifically, I am interested in exploring how states’ 
political, racial, and religious contexts may affect recipients’ level of benefits. First, to 
what extent does an association exist between state political ideology and the average 
monthly cash TANF payment received by families? Second, to what extent does the 
average monthly TANF payment received between white and black recipients differ? Is 
the difference larger in more conservative states compared to more liberal states? How do 
other cultural contexts such as religion affect the average monthly TANF payment? To 
answer these questions, data from 1998-2013 of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) is used to examine how individuals’ monthly average TANF cash 
assistance payments vary by characteristics such as race, political ideology, and religious 
belief. This research project addresses the following four hypotheses. 
5 
 
H1: On average, TANF recipients will receive higher monthly TANF cash 
benefits in states with a more liberal political ideology compared to states 
with a more conservative ideology. 
H2: On average, white TANF recipients will receive higher monthly TANF cash 
benefits compared to black TANF recipients.  
H3: On average, states with a larger African American population will have lower 
average monthly TANF benefits compared to states with a smaller African 
American population.  
H4: On average, states with a higher rate of Evangelicals will have lower average 
monthly TANF benefits compared to states with a lower rate of Evangelicals. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
How Do State Welfare Programs Vary? 
 
Prior to 1997, welfare was distributed through the federally-mandated Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Although states had flexibility in 
forming their own welfare programs, federal requirements and oversight helped ensure 
those who met federal eligibility criteria received benefits (Page and Larner 1997). After 
the implementation of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in 
1997, states set their own eligibility requirements for benefits which include 
“establish[ing] income definitions, income tests, earned income disregards, and need 
standards” (Rowe and Giannarelli 2006:1). For example, in 2016 the lowest maximum 
income eligibility per month for a family of three was $269 in Alabama and the highest 
was $2,243 in Minnesota, a difference of -733.83% (The Urban Institute 2016). The 
amount of cash assistance a family can receive also varies by state. In 2016, the 
maximum monthly benefit for a family of three in Alabama was $215 and $532 in 
Minnesota, a difference of -147.44%. Federal regulations restrict how long a family may 
receive cash assistance to lifetime limit of five years, but states may set a shorter time 
limit. In 2016, Arizona has the shortest lifetime limit of 12 months. Thus, depending 
upon the state of residence, a family’s access to and assistance from TANF varies 
dramatically. 
Consequently, states now vary greatly in the amount spent to provide basic cash 
assistance. For example, in 2015 Arizona spent 6% of its federal and state TANF funds 
on basic cash assistance, whereas Kentucky spent 55% (CBPP 2017). Looking at just 
cash assistance, Kentucky spent more than five times as much as Arizona, despite the fact 
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that Kentucky had on average only twice as many TANF recipients (48,274) as Arizona 
(23,522) in 2015 (ACF 2016b). Overall, the amount of states’ budgets spent on basic 
assistance decreased by 64% from 1997-2016 (CBPP 2017). Other TANF benefits may 
also include job training programs, childcare assistance, transportation assistance, or 
other support services offered for low-income families (CBPP 2016). While nationwide 
TANF spending for non-cash benefits represents nearly 75% of total state and federal 
TANF expenditures in 2016 (CBPP 2017), this research focuses on cash income 
assistance because it is the most consistent TANF benefit to compare across states (Rowe 
and Giannarelli 2006). Non-cash benefits can be difficult to compare across states due to 
the variation in the types of support services offered by different states. In addition, when 
considering effects at the individual level, people are more likely to know how much they 
receive in cash assistance as opposed to the dollar value of the TANF non-cash services 
they may receive. Therefore, this research project focuses on TANF cash assistance 
benefits.  
How Does Racialization Shape Welfare Policies? 
 
Racial context has been, and continues to be, a very influential factor in the 
development of the U.S. welfare state (Schram et al. 2003). Race is not just an individual-
level attribute, it is a social construct embedded in laws and policies that affect every 
aspect of life (Werum 1997). Omi and Winnat describe race as a “master category – a 
fundamental concept that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, the history, 
polity, economic structure, and culture of the United States” (Omi and Winant 2014:106). 
During the 1930s-1960s, African Americans and other racial minorities were largely 
excluded from receiving welfare benefits (Brown 1999; Quadagno 1996). During that 
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period, African American mothers were denied benefits by “suitable household” policy 
provisions that disqualified any unmarried woman found living with a man from 
receiving benefits (Quadagno 1996). Also at that time, southern “black codes” excluded 
providing benefits during planting and harvest seasons so that low-income mothers would 
be more motivated to participate in the lowly paid agricultural workforce (Hall 2005; 
Steinberg 1990).  
After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it became more difficult to deny 
benefits outright to African Americans. As the number of African American welfare 
recipients increased, the narrative around and sentiments toward welfare began to change 
(Katz 2013; Quadagno 1996). Whereas poverty was once seen as the problem to solve, 
the poor themselves became viewed as the problem. The Moynihan report released in 
1965 blamed the disintegration of black families as the primary cause of the increased 
need for welfare (Quadagno 1996). Racial stereotypes and media portrayals of the poor as 
deviant African Americans living in the ghetto supported this perspective. Unfortunately, 
many of the negative stereotypes that associate welfare with poor African Americans 
persist today. The perception that blacks are lazy is highly influential of white 
respondents’ opposition to welfare spending and negative attitude towards welfare, even 
more so than the overall perception that poor people are lazy (Gilens 1996). 
Americans opposed to welfare claimed that the program would have detrimental 
effects on the country (Katz 2013). Many of the arguments against welfare can be 
explained by group threat theory that posits when perceived characteristics of an 
outgroup are thought to threaten the ingroup, the ingroup experiences increased prejudice 
and discrimination against the outgroup (Giles and Hertz 1994; Stephan and Stephan 
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2009). Based on group threat theory, racial threat is experienced when the dominant 
racial group (whites in the U.S.) views or is concerned with a racial minority group 
increasing in size or power (King and Wheelock 2007; Quillian 1996).  
Threats to a group typically fall into two categories: realistic and symbolic. 
Realistic group threats are described as those that threaten “a group’s power, resources, 
and general welfare …[while] symbolic group threats are threats to a group’s religion, 
values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality, or worldview” (Stephan and 
Stephan 2009:5). One study found that measures of realistic threat was a significant 
predictor of people’s attitudes towards affirmative action (Renfro et al. 2006). Brown 
(2013) found that media and opinion pieces included racialized discourse regarding 
welfare reform in Georgia. However, in Alabama a non-racialized dispute influenced the 
welfare reform debate. The difference between the two states’ welfare policies was 
notable, with Georgia instituting more restrictive and stringent welfare policies (Brown 
2013). That is not to say that racialized discourse does not occur in Alabama, but rather it 
highlights how policies shift when the dominant group feels threatened.  
 Racial dynamics continue to be an influential factor in state welfare programs 
today. Despite efforts to establish a “post-racial” society, research points to the enduring 
salience of race and ethnicity (Dawson and Bobo 2009; Smith, McPherson, and Smith-
Lovin 2014). For example, white people feel more threatened as the size of a minority 
group increases within a given population (Brown 2013). Research has shown that states 
with a higher percentage of African Americans receiving welfare is significantly 
associated with more stringent sanctions, stricter time limits, and family caps (Gooden 
2006; Rodgers, Payne, and Chervachidze 2006; Soss 2001). Therefore, I expect to find a 
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difference in the average monthly TANF cash assistance payment between white and 
black TANF recipients.  
Ideological/Cultural Context Matters 
The political ideology of a state can shape state-level welfare policies, such that 
the policies tend to conform to the values of the dominant political ideology. Social 
conservatives generally view the causes of poverty as individualistic, where individuals 
are deemed to live in poverty due to poor choices or mistakes (Zucker and Weiner 1993). 
Liberals, on the other hand, tend to view poverty as the result of structural or systematic 
barriers outside of the individual’s control. Libertarians believe that individual freedoms 
grant people the opportunity to succeed and therefore are strongly opposed to state-
sponsored redistributive policies (Zwolinski et al. 2016). While many different factors 
may contribute to people’s views on poverty, ideologically-based perceptions regarding 
how responsible the poor are for their circumstances can influence whether people are 
considered deserving or undeserving of assistance (Katz 2013). People typically assign 
responsibility towards one level or the other, and the side they choose is often closely 
related to their political ideology (Kelso 1994; Zucker and Weiner 1993). The 
coalescence of individuals’ ideological beliefs forms a collective culture that influences 
the social structure of society. As Bourdieu (1989:1) notes “there exist, within the social 
world itself…objective structures independent of the consciousness and will of agents, 
which are capable of guiding and constraining their practices or their representations.”  
Researchers have developed several ways to gauge a state’s ideological leanings. 
For instance, Erikson, Wright Jr., and McIver (1989) found a strong correlation between 
the mean ideological position of the state and the ideological positions of party elites. 
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They also found that citizen preferences were more influential in the level of state policy 
liberalism compared to state economic and social factors (Wright Jr, Erikson, and McIver 
1987). State representatives’ political ideology is influenced by the opinions of active 
state citizens in an effort to be elected or re-elected and by party elites to maintain party 
support (Berry et al. 2010). Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (2010) found state 
government ideology scores to be relatively stable, but other states did experience 
ideological fluctuations over time. In contrast, the state citizen ideology scores were less 
volatile during the same time period (Berry et al. 2010).  
State government control, defined as the political party that has the majority 
control of the state legislature and the governor’s office, is measured because partisanship 
is expected to influence policy outcomes (Schmidt 1996). The reason why this is of 
interest at the state level is because party representation is less balanced at the state level 
compared to the federal level. In 2016, seats in the U.S. Senate and the House were 
almost evenly split between Republican and Democratic Party control (52% and 55% 
respectively). In comparison, partisan power is becoming more concentrated in the state 
governments. A state government trifecta occurs when a party is in control of the 
governor’s office and holds a majority in the House and Senate. In 2016, 32 states had a 
state government trifecta with 81% of those controlled by Republicans and 19% 
controlled by Democrats (Lucy Burns Institute 2017).  
The effects of partisan control in the state government are further exacerbated by 
the growing political ideological divide between Democrats and Republicans (Pew 
Research Center 2014). Party ideology can frame the perceived causes of poverty, 
thereby influencing proposed social policy solutions. Welfare policy reform requirements 
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reflect the notion that people in poverty are lazy or irresponsible. For example, the belief 
that people on welfare chose not to work contributed to the implementation of a five-year 
lifetime limit on TANF benefits (Schram et al. 2003).  
Religious belief is another factor that may influence one’s views on welfare. A 
Pew Research Center study found that approximately 50% of adults in the sample say 
that religion is very important to their views on government assistance to the poor and 
that of those same adults 57% think it does more harm than good (Pew Research Center 
2015). Of the various religious denominations, only Evangelical Protestant and Mormon 
respondents (56% and 64%, respectively) stated government assistance does more harm 
than good. Given that 25.4% of the Christians in the U.S. identify as Evangelical 
Protestants and that they are more likely to have a stronger religious affiliation, it is 
possible that the prevalence of conservative Christians in a state may affect welfare 
policy (Pew Research Center 2015; Schwadel 2012). 
Evangelicals’ lack of support for welfare may be based on perceptions of welfare 
recipients, or more broadly the poor, which threaten their traditional family values and 
culture. Brint and Abrutyn (2010) found that moral standards traditionalism, defined as a 
cognitive framework founded in moral absolutism and resistance to change, significantly 
affected Evangelicals views on government social spending. Specifically, Steensland and 
Wright (2014) found that negative stereotypes about welfare recipients as single, teenage 
mothers having multiple babies out of wedlock threaten Evangelicals’ norms regarding 
sexual purity and family structure.  
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Demographic Context Matters 
 Different welfare policies at the state level serve as a type of natural experiment in 
which to examine how state-level political ideology affects individual welfare recipients’ 
benefits and whether that effect is moderated by the individuals’ race. The interaction 
between race and political ideology is likely complicated and may not even be a 
conscious decision for most. Gainous (2012) found that people’s desire for limited 
government may hide a racial bias, since people can object on the basis of what appears 
to be a non-racial issue. Craig and Richeson (2014) found that by highlighting racial 
demographics of growing minority populations resulted in unaffiliated white Americans 
expressing more conservative opinions and leaning more towards the Republican party. 
However, in experiments that included conditioning which reaffirmed white Americans’ 
status in the racial hierarchy (eliminating the notion of racial minorities as a threat), the 
shift in conservative ideology did not occur. Clearly, there is more to understand 
regarding how race influences political ideology and how those together affect welfare 
policies.  
Different social contexts can influence public policy design and implementation 
resulting in unequal distributions of power and privilege for various groups (Bedolla 
2007). Prior studies focused on variations in state TANF programs found differences 
associated with state characteristics such as the state economy, the political party in 
power, and racial discrimination. My research expands the analysis of state welfare 
variations by focusing on how state characteristics are associated with individual 
outcomes, controlling for individual-level and state-level factors.  
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CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
Data Source on Welfare Payments and Other Individual-level Measures 
The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a longitudinal 
nationwide survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau, provides the basis for my 
analyses. For this study, data from partial waves of the 1996 panel and full waves of the 
2002, 2004, 2008 panels were used, such that the years covered include 1998-2013. Each 
wave covers a four-month period and each panel contains anywhere between ten to 
sixteen waves, so panels typically cross over three to six years. The survey was primarily 
designed to collect a nationally representative sample of detailed income information and 
participation in government assistance programs, along with demographic and contextual 
data. In addition, low-income households were oversampled to provide a sufficient 
number of participants of government transfer programs for analysis (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2008).  
The sample is based on residents of the United States ages 15 years and older, 
excluding those living in institutions or military barracks. The sampling frame includes a 
list of U.S. counties and independent cities. To select the sample, SIPP uses a two-stage 
sampling design. The first stage involves the selection of primary sampling units (PSUs). 
Smaller PSUs, referred to as non-self-representing (NSR), are grouped with other same-
state similar PSUs based on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics to form 
strata. A sample of the NSR PSUs is selected to represent all PSUs within a given 
stratum. The second stage of sampling is the selection of addresses from the PSUs. 
Addresses are selected from three independent, non-overlapping sampling frames that 
include unit, group quarters, and housing unit coverage. For each sample PSU, addresses 
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are grouped into clusters. The clusters are then sampled to select the interview addresses. 
Everyone in the household is asked to participate in the interview. (U.S. Census Bureau 
2008). 
Coverage errors in the SIPP may include missed living quarters, missed persons 
within a sample household, people who have moved that cannot be reached, and more 
transient populations such as the homeless. One particular coverage issue for the SIPP is 
differential undercoverage of minority subgroups, primarily black and Hispanic adult 
males. For example, in the 2004 panel the coverage ratio for all people together was 
about 0.89 but was approximately 0.69 and 0.64 for black and Hispanic adult males, 
respectively. The U.S. Census Bureau addresses the undercoverage issue by using post-
stratification adjustments and non-interview adjustments in developing the final weights 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2008).  
The SIPP includes several different weight variables to account for nonresponse, 
attrition, poststratification adjustments, and subsampling within clusters. The dataset 
includes a strata variable (GVARSTR) as well as a cluster variable (GHLFSAM) to 
adjust the variance estimation due to the complex survey design. The longitudinal 
calendar year person weight (LGTCYxWT) was used to adjust for sampling design. Final 
calendar year weights were calculated only for people for whom data were collected for 
each month in the year (US Census Bureau 2018).  
SIPP addresses missing data in a few different ways. According to chapter four of 
the SIPP user guide (US Census Bureau 2008), for item nonresponse data editing is used 
when the information can be inferred from other provided data. When data editing is not 
possible, data imputation is used instead. SIPP uses a sequential hot-deck data imputation 
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method where missing data is replaced with data from another person or household with 
similar characteristics. This process starts with a hot deck array created for each variable 
and is stratified by select demographic variables such as age, race, and sex. Hot decks are 
initially loaded with cold deck values and then are supplemented with complete responses 
that become available donors. The imputation process is fully deterministic such that 
using the same file and edit program will replicate the same imputations. The imputations 
are done in two phases where waves one through four are imputed cross-sectionally. 
After that, phase two includes longitudinal edits of select demographic variables across 
the four waves.  
The SIPP accounts for most types of unit nonresponse by using weighting 
adjustments. However, for a specific type of unit nonresponse data imputation is used 
instead. Interviews designated as Type Z are those where at least one household member 
was interviewed but interviews were not obtained from one or more other people in the 
household. In Type Z imputations, the data for an entire unit is imputed from a single 
donor. Donors are selected using hierarchical sorting and matching based on a set of non-
missing variables for both the donor and the recipient. In the first wave, the definition of 
the hot deck cells is based on only current wave responses. In subsequent waves, hot deck 
cell definitions may include values from prior waves although the donor values are only 
taken from the current wave. Survey analysts strive to maintain the univariate distribution 
for each imputed variable. 
Data Subsample 
The monthly data for each person was consolidated over each calendar year to 
create one observation per person per year. The consolidation procedure for each variable 
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is included in the variable descriptions below. Only people listed as a TANF authorized 
representative at some point during the calendar year are included in the sample. An 
authorized recipient is the person who actually received the income for all people in their 
program unit. A program unit is defined as “each adult and child, [that] received benefits 
(either directly or by virtue of his or her relationship to another person designated as the 
principal recipient) from [the] program each month” (US Census Bureau 2008). From 
1998-2013, the total number of people identified as TANF authorized representatives was 
9,197.  
Congruent with the research questions, only respondents who identified as white 
or black are included in the subsample examined here. Respondents who identified as a 
race other than white or black were excluded (n=928). People from the state of Nebraska 
were excluded due to the nonpartisan design of its unicameral state government, as has 
been done in other analyses including state governments (n=36) (Soss et al. 2008). People 
from Washington D.C. were also excluded since D.C. is not a state (n=56). People who 
moved to a different state, moved and were unable to be followed, or moved and were out 
of scope during a calendar year were also excluded (n=127). Lastly, people with a 
calendar year weight of zero, meaning they did not have data for all months of the 
calendar year, were excluded (n=2,936).  
Variables  
Overall, the subsample contained 5,114 respondents identified as TANF 
authorized representatives from 49 states during the period of 1998-2013. Table 1 
provides the descriptive statistics of the sample. The dependent variable in the analysis is 
the average monthly TANF cash assistance payment received per program unit. This data 
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was collected for each month and averaged over the number of months the respondent 
received benefits for each calendar year. The average monthly TANF payment was 
$266.31 (sd=224.13). The key respondent independent variable is race. In the subsample 
61.85% of the respondents identified as white (n=3,163) and 38.15% identified as black 
(n=1,951).  
Other respondent variables used as controls include the person’s average monthly 
earned income, sex, months employed, and number of children in the household1. Earned 
income is used to determine eligibility and level of welfare benefits (Giannarelli et al. 
2017). The average monthly earned income (m=$396.56, se: $951.05) is the person’s 
earned income averaged over the calendar year. Gender is included in the model to 
explore how welfare policy developed under a patriarchal system that affects a 
disproportion number women may support or reinforce gender inequalities (Orloff 1996). 
The sex variable had two categories: male (11.9%, n=607) and female (88.1%, n=4,507). 
The recipients’ term of employment is included to examine how the duration of 
employment may affects a recipients’ benefits independent of the income actually earned 
(Dodson 2013). Months employed is the number of months a person had some type of 
employment during a given calendar year (mean=10.93, se: 2.41). Dependent children are 
taken into consideration when determining the level of welfare benefits (Giannarelli et al. 
2017). For the number of children in the household under the age of 18 years old, the 
responses were collapsed into four different categories: zero children (16.6%, n=847), 
one child (26.1%, n=1,333), two children (25.3%, n=1,296), and three or more children 
(32.1%, n=1,638).  
                                                        
1 Initial models also included the recipient’s age, education, and marital status as control variables, but are 
not in the final models due to nonsignificant coefficients. 
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Sources for State-level Data  
State-level data were retrieved from a multitude of sources and were merged into 
SIPP observations using state and year. A state-level race variable, the percentage of the 
state population identified as black, is included to test the group threat theory at the state 
level (King and Wheelock 2007). Data on state population by race came from the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s annual estimation of state population characteristics. A political 
ideology variable is included because it informs perceptions of deservingness and 
approaches to addressing poverty that influences the development and implementation of 
welfare policies (Katz 2013; Zucker and Weiner 1993). I use the state citizen ideology2 
measure developed by Berry, Fording, Rinquist, Hanson, and Klarner (2010). State 
citizen ideology is a yearly measure based on an analysis of votes for congressional seats 
and interest-group ratings of members of Congress. Other researchers frequently use 
these measures as demonstrated by more than 1,500 citations (Berry et al. 1998). The 
scale of the measures ranges from zero to one-hundred, with zero representing fully 
conservative and one-hundred representing fully liberal. The state citizen ideology mean 
was 55.62 (sd: 11.94).  
Including state-level economic indicators facilitates exploring how a state’s 
economic conditions may affect how it implements social policy (Jacobs and Callaghan 
2013). The Urban Institute provided the state and local tax revenue per capita data that 
came from the U.S. Census Bureau Annual Survey of State and Local Government 
Finances and Census of Governments (The Urban Institute 2017). The mean state 
                                                        
2 I also tested state government ideology from Berry et al. (2010) and a state government control variable 
from a database created by Klarner (2003) based on three parts of the state government: the house, the 
senate, and the governor’s office. The model explored each ideology variable individually and state citizen 
ideology was selected because it had the largest standardized coefficient of the three ideology variables.  
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revenue per capita3 was $4,539 (sd: 1,119) and was adjusted for inflation to 2013 dollars 
using the U.S. Consumer Price Index.  
Religious beliefs may influence states constituents’ views on social programs 
such as TANF (Steensland and Wright 2014). Therefore, the rate of Evangelical 
Protestants is included to assess the effect of religious beliefs separately from political 
beliefs. Data for the rate of Evangelical Protestants per 1,000 people per state came from 
the Religious Congregations and Membership Study 2000 and 2010 surveys administered 
by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (The Association of 
Religion Data Archives 2012). The data on rates of Evangelical Protestants were only 
available for the years 2000 and 2010, thus the rate for 2000 was used for years 1998-
2005 and the 2010 rate was used for years 2006-2013. The average rate of Evangelical 
Protestants per 1,000 people was 125.29 (sd: 97.38). 
In the SIPP 1996 and 2002 panels, certain states were combined and reported 
together. Vermont and Maine were combined into one state unit and North Dakota, South 
Dakota, and Wyoming were combined into another state unit. Adjustments were made to 
the state-level data for these states in all years using a weighted average based on the 
state population for each year.  
Analytic Methods  
First, subclass mean differences are estimated using the svy: mean procedures and 
the lincom post estimation command in Stata 15. Both analyses include survey weight 
and sampling design adjustments (Heeringa, West, and Berglund 2017). The subclasses 
                                                        
3 Other state economic indicators tested include state median household income, state poverty rate, state 
GDP, and state unemployment rate. State revenue per capita was retained because it had the largest 
standardized coefficient of all the state economic indicators. The other state economic variables were 
dropped from the model to reduce multicollinearity.  
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reflect primary independent variables including the recipient’s race, the state’s percent of 
black residents, state political ideology, and the state’s proportion of Evangelicals. For 
the mean difference comparisons, the continuous variables are transformed into binary 
variables using the 50th percentile as the cutoff point. The binary variable for a state’s 
black population is sorted into lower black population (50.39%, n=2,577) and higher 
black population (49.61%, n=2,537). The binary variable of state citizen ideology is 
categorized as more conservative (51%, n=2,608) and more liberal (49%, n=2,506). The 
binary variable of a state’s proportion of Evangelicals is grouped into fewer Evangelicals 
(48.42%, n=2,476) and greater Evangelicals (51.58%, n=2,638).  
Next, analyses using a survey design adjusted OLS regression model (svy: regress 
function) focus on four distinct models: one with individual-level variables only (Model 
1), one with state-level variables only (Model 2), one with both individual-level and 
state-level variables (the full model, Model 3), and the full model plus the interaction 
terms (Model 4). To test the group threat theory, a state’s black population is multiplied 
with state citizen ideology, state evangelical rate, and state revenue per capita to form 
three interaction terms. Appendix A includes tables for descriptive statistics, subclass 
mean differences, and OLS regression models.
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
Single Subclass Comparisons 
Results from the single subclass means tests are presented in Table 3 and support 
all four hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 tested whether TANF recipients in states with a more 
liberal political ideology receive larger monthly cash assistance payments compared to 
TANF recipients in states with a more conservative political ideology. Analyses suggest 
support for this hypothesis. Specifically, TANF recipients in states with a more 
conservative political ideology received on average $234.40 per month and recipients in 
more liberal states received on average $298.01 per month. The results show that 
recipients in more conservative states receive on average 27.14% less per month ($63.61, 
p <0.001) compared to recipients in more liberal states.  
 Hypothesis 2 tested whether white TANF recipients receive larger average 
monthly TANF payments compared to black TANF recipients. Results indicate support 
for this hypothesis as well.  Specifically, the average monthly TANF payment for white 
recipients was $277.70 and $251.79 for black recipients. On average, black recipients 
receive 9.33% ($25.91, p<0.004) less than white recipients.   
Hypothesis 3 explored the extent to which monthly TANF payments vary across 
states with a lower black population versus a higher black population. Mean difference 
outcomes demonstrate concurrence with this hypnosis. For example, TANF recipients in 
states with a lower black population received on average $321.26 per month and 
recipients in states with a higher black population received $212.95 per month. On 
average, TANF recipients in states with a lower black population receive 33.71% more 
($108.31, p<0.001) than recipients in states with higher black populations.  
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 Hypothesis 4 posits that states with more Evangelicals provide lower average 
monthly TANF benefits compared to states with fewer Evangelicals. TANF recipients in 
states with fewer Evangelicals receive on average $316.85 per month and recipients in 
states with a greater number of Evangelicals receive on average $214.16 per month. 
Recipients in states with fewer Evangelicals receive on average 32.41% more ($102.68, 
p<0.001) than recipients in states with a larger proportion of Evangelicals.  
Multiple Subclass Comparisons 
 Congruent with group threat theory, more detailed subclasses explore how 
average monthly TANF payments vary by the primary state-level characteristics and a 
state’s black population. Table 4 shows the mean differences based on state political 
ideology and Evangelical rate were further differentiated by a state’s black population. 
The largest difference in average monthly TANF payments was for more liberal states 
with a lower black population that received on average 47% more ($167.63, p<0.001) 
compared to more conservative states with a higher black population. Conversely, the 
lowest difference was between more conservative states with a lower black population 
only received on average 16.1% ($45.26, p=0.001) more than more liberal states with a 
higher black population. These results indicate that the effects of state political ideology 
and state racial composition may be exacerbated or offset, resulting in differential 
average monthly TANF payments for individuals. For example, more conservative states 
have a lower monthly average TANF payment ($234.40) and states with higher black 
population also have a lower monthly average TANF payment ($212.95). States with 
both characteristics are doubly impacted with an average monthly TANF payment that is 
12.5% lower still ($189.36).  
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 Likewise, TANF recipients’ average monthly TANF payment is further 
differentiated by the combined effects of a state’s Evangelical rate and black population, 
as shown in Table 4. The largest difference was for states with fewer Evangelicals and a 
lower black population received on average 44.1% more ($162.20, p<0.001) than states 
with a greater number of Evangelicals and a higher black population. There was no 
significant difference for recipients in states with a lower black population and a greater 
number of Evangelicals ($230.57) compared to states with a higher black population and 
a fewer Evangelicals ($225.91). The results indicate that the effect of a state’s 
Evangelical rate merges with the effect of its black population resulting in significant 
differences. For example, individuals in states with a higher black population receive on 
average $212.95 and individuals in states with a greater number of Evangelicals receive 
$214.16. Individuals in states with both characteristics receive on average 3.6% less 
($205.30). Compared to other variables described above, this effect appears relatively 
moderate or small in its impact on TANF payments.  
OLS Linear Regression 
While the difference in means is statistically significant, it does not take in to 
account other factors that may affect the average monthly TANF payment. A survey 
design adjusted multiple linear regression analysis helps evaluate how the key variables 
shape individual monthly TANF cash assistance payments. Table 5 shows various 
progressions of the estimated model including individual-level predictors only (Model 1), 
state-level predictors only (Model 2), individual- and state-level characteristics together 
(the full model, Model 3), and the full model with interaction terms (Model 4). Given that 
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the models are all very similar, the discussion of the analysis will focus on Models 4, 
with comments regarding where the other models differ.  
A model using only individual-level predictors (Model 1), explains 13.64% of the 
variance in the average monthly TANF payment (F(7,108)=56.28, p<0.001). Including only 
state-level predictors (Model 2) explains 5.72% of the variance in the monthly average 
TANF payment (F(4,111)=42.66, p<0.001). The fact that the state-level predictors predict a 
smaller portion of the variance is not surprising considering that the level of TANF 
benefits is set based on individual characteristics such as household earned income and 
number of dependent children. However, the state-level characteristics are also important 
because they can affect how the various levels of benefits are determined (Rowe and 
Giannarelli 2006). The variance explained by the full model, including both individual- 
and state-level characteristics with interaction terms (Model 4) is 20.8% (F(14,101)=41.46, 
p<0.001).    
Individual-Level Characteristics  
A recipient’s average monthly earned income is statistically significant but does 
not have a very large effect on the predicted monthly TANF payment (β=-0.03, se:0.01, 
p=0.006). For example, a single mother with one child earning $500 per month is 
estimated to have an average monthly TANF payment of $224.45 (other predictors held 
at the mean). If that same woman’s average monthly earned income increases to $1,000 
per month, her expected average monthly TANF payment decreases by 6.6% ($14.83). 
The number of months employed in a year has a larger effect with a decrease of $9.53 
(se: 1.35, p<0.001) in the monthly average TANF payment for each month employed. For 
example, if a single mother with one child worked four months (other variables held at 
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the mean), her estimated monthly TANF payment would be $235.95. If she worked 
eights month, her estimated monthly TANF payment would be $197.84, a reduction of 
16.2% ($38.12).  
A recipient’s sex is a significant predictor with women receiving on average 
$41.80 more (se: 11.29, p<0.001) per month than men. This reflects the patriarchal 
influence in policy design that views men as the primary breadwinners and therefore are 
expected to earn more. The number of children in the household 18 years or younger has 
the strongest effect on the predicted average monthly TANF payment (1 child: β=95.07, 
se: 10.34; 2 children: β=139.30, se: 11.51; 3+ children: β=208.83, se: 12.71; all p<0.001). 
For example, a single mother with one child is expected to receive on average $172.97 
per month (other variables held at mean) versus a single mother with three children is 
expected to receive on average $286.73, an increase of 65.8% ($113.76).  
In the full models, the recipient’s race is no longer a significant predictor. It is 
interesting to note that when only individual characteristics are included in the model 
(Model 1), an individual’s race appears as a statistically significant predictor (black 
recipients expected to receive on average $36.87 less (se: 8.64, p<0.001) than white 
recipients). The fact that this strong predictor in the partial model drops out entirely in the 
full model indicates a spurious relationship and points to the importance of previously 
omitted variables that drive the individual-level results.  In this case, findings indicate the 
average monthly TANF payment received does not depend on the individual race of 
recipients per se. Instead, the model indicates that differences between white and black 
recipients’ average monthly TANF payment is being driven by state-level characteristics.  
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This finding may seem counterintuitive but is reasonable considering that the 
formulas for determining benefits cannot vary based upon race. However, we do know 
from previous research that African Americans are discriminated against in other ways 
including increased and more severe sanctioning for program noncompliance (Fording et 
al. 2011; Schram, Soss, and Fording 2010). 
State-Level Characteristics 
  A state’s political ideological leaning has a significant impact on TANF 
recipients’ monthly payments. Looking first at the full model without interaction terms 
(Model 3), state citizen ideology has a positive association (β=1.30, se: 0.514, p=0.013) 
indicating that as a state’s political ideology leans more liberal, the average monthly 
TANF payment is expected to increase. For example, a single mother with one child in a 
moderately liberal state is estimated to receive an average monthly TANF payment of 
$205.25 compared to $140.07 in a moderately conservative state, an increase of 46.5% 
($65.18).  
 A state’s religious composition also significantly affects TANF recipients’ 
average monthly payments. Referring to Model 3, the data show a negative association 
between the rate of Evangelical Protestants and the average monthly TANF payment (β=-
4.44, se: 0.586, p<0.001). The model predicts that a single mother with one child in a 
state with a lower than average rate of Evangelicals (25th percentile, 5.7%) would receive 
an average monthly payment of $219.04 holding all other variables at the mean. That 
same mother in a state with a higher than average number of Evangelicals (75th 
percentile, 14%) would receive on average $182.22 per month, a decrease of 20.2%  
(-$36.82).  
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 A state’s economic condition can also impact a TANF recipient’s monthly 
payment, but to a lesser degree. Using Model 3, a state’s revenue per capita has a 
negative association with a TANF recipient’s average monthly payment (β=-14.2, se: 
4.72, p=0.003). Continuing with the example above, a single mother with one child in a 
moderately poor state (25th percentile, $3,559 per capita) receives an average monthly 
TANF payment of $171.17 compared to a similar single mother in a moderately wealthy 
state (75th percentile, $4,682 per capita) who receives $187.11, a difference of 9.3% 
($15.94). This seems counterintuitive on one hand because a state with more revenue 
should have more funding available for programs like TANF. On the other hand, it may 
reflect an increased social distance between the rich and the poor that may result in less 
generous policies based on welfare stereotypes.  
 A state’s racial composition also influences the average monthly payment 
received by TANF recipients. Model 3 shows a negative association between a state’s 
black population and the average monthly TANF payment individuals receive (β=-3.04, 
se: 0.67, p<0.001). For example, a single mother with one child in a state with a lower 
than average black population (25th percentile, 7%) is expected to receive on average 
$194.10. If that single mother lived in a state with an higher than average black 
population (75th percentile, 16%), she would receive $166.72, a decrease of 16.4% (-
$27.38). Model 3 only shows part of the story, as a state’s percent of African Americans 
also interacts with other state characteristics to further affect an individual’s monthly 
average TANF payment.  
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Interaction of State-Level Characteristics 
 Model 4 presents the full model of individual- and state-level characteristics 
adding interactions between a state’s black population and the three other state-level 
characteristics including state citizen political ideology, state Evangelical rate, and state 
revenue per capita. The coefficient for the interaction between state citizen ideology and 
state black population is 20.427 (se: 6.639, p=0.003). Figure 1 shows the predicted 
average monthly TANF payment for a single mother with one child in a state with a 
lower than average black population (25th percentile, 7%) compared to a state with a 
higher than average black population (75th percentile, 16%). 
 
The graph shows the difference in the average monthly TANF payment is greater for 
recipients in states with a lower black population compared to states with a higher black 
population. In contrast, in moderately liberal states there is very little difference in 
30 
 
estimated payments for recipients in states with a lower black population compared to 
states with a greater black population.  
The interaction coefficient between states’ black population and Evangelical rate 
is 2.63 (se: 0.605, p<0.001). Figure 2 shows the estimated decrease in average monthly 
TANF payments for recipients in states with a higher rate of Evangelicals. 
For states with a lower than average Evangelical rate (25th percentile, 5.7%) the 
difference in the estimated average monthly TANF payment between states with a lower 
than average percent of African Americans compared to states with a higher than average 
percent of African Americans is $55.51. The same comparison in states with a higher 
than average rate of Evangelicals (75th percentile, 14%) results in a difference of $35.86. 
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This indicates the “penalty” for living in a state with a higher percentage of African 
Americans is slightly offset in states with a higher rate of Evangelicals.  
There is a negative association between a state’s revenue per capita and the state’s 
percentage of African Americans (β=-0.355, se: 0.085, p<0.001). Figure 3 shows that as a 
state’s revenue per capita increases, the difference in the average monthly TANF 
payment increases between states with a lower than average percent of African 
Americans versus states with a higher than average percent of African Americans. 
For example, in states with a lower state revenue per capita (25th percentile, $3,559) the 
difference in the estimated average monthly TANF payment is $13.96. In states with a 
higher state revenue per capita (75th percentile, $4,682), the difference in the estimated 
average monthly TANF payment is $54.21. This indicates that a higher percentage of 
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African Americans in the population is perceived as more of a threat in states with a 
higher revenue per capita.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
This study explored how state political context shapes individuals’ average 
monthly TANF cash assistance payments. Models operationalized state characteristics as 
state citizen ideology, state Evangelical composition, state revenue per capita, and the 
state black population. The analyses included a progression of OLS regression models 
adjusted for complex survey design. In addition, subclass means were used to test for 
group differences.  
Difference in means tests as well as the OLS regression results support all four 
hypotheses. The models show a positive association between a state’s political ideology 
leaning and average monthly TANF payment. This indicates that as a state’s ideology 
leans more liberal, the average monthly TANF payment increases. In contrast, there is a 
negative association between a state’s religious composition and average monthly TANF 
payment such that as the rate of Evangelicals increases, the predicted average monthly 
TANF payment decreases. Similarly, a negative association exists with the state’s 
revenue per capita whereas the state’s revenue per capita increases the expected average 
monthly TANF payment decreases. Lastly, the results show how states with a larger 
percent of African Americans directly and indirectly negatively affects recipients’ 
average monthly TANF payment.  
 The results support previous literature that identifies racial discrimination in 
welfare programs (Quadagno 1996; Schram et al. 2010). The results also support the 
group threat theory in that as the percent of African Americans increase in the state, the 
average monthly TANF payment is expected to decrease (King and Wheelock 2007). In 
addition, the results back the notation that the state political ideology can affect 
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individuals’ average monthly TANF payment (Kelso 1994; Zucker and Weiner 1993). 
While many studies have focused on the U.S. welfare system, few have investigated how 
state characteristics may be associated with individual-level welfare cash benefits. This 
study expands the literature by investigating the association of state-level characteristics 
such as political ideology, racial and religious composition, and economic factors on 
individuals’ monthly TANF cash assistance payments using a national, representative 
sample.  
 Limitations of this study include the modeling limitations in answering the 
research question. Ideally, a survey design adjusted multilevel model is the preferable 
method for analyzing the data and evaluating the between-group variance. However, it 
would require a three-level model (observations nested within people nested within 
states) that would then need to be adjusted for the complex survey design. Researchers 
are still in the process of developing models that can handle the complexities of three-
level models and complex survey design (Heeringa et al. 2017).  
 TANF is an important program for aiding low-income families in need. However, 
not all families may receive equal assistance. Welfare recipients are still disadvantaged 
by systemic racial bias that perpetuates economic inequalities. With welfare policy 
delegated to the state level, state characteristics may also influence the level of benefits 
available to families. Further research is needed to evaluate if state differences in TANF 
programs ameliorate or exacerbate racial disparities in and overall success of lifting 
families out of poverty.  
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APPENDIX A: TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of SIPP TANF Recipients and Related State 
Characteristics for 1998-2013 
Dependent Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Average monthly TANF cash payment 266.31 224.13 
Individual-level Independent Variables     
Ave. monthly earned income 396.56 951.05 
Months employed per year 10.93 2.41 
  Freq. Percent 
Race     
White 3,163 61.85% 
Black 1,951 38.15% 
Sex     
Male 607 11.87% 
Female 4,507 88.13% 
No. of children in household      
Zero children 847 16.56% 
One child 1,333 26.07% 
Two children 1,296 25.34% 
Three or more children 1,638 32.08% 
State-level Independent Variables Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
State citizen ideology 55.62 11.94 
State revenue per capita  4,538.97 1,119.09 
State evangelical rate (per 1,000 population) 125.29 97.38 
Percent state population - Black 0.12 0.07 
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Table 2. Correlation Table for Continuous Variables           
Variable 
Ave. 
monthly 
welfare 
payment 
Ave. 
monthly 
earned 
income 
No. 
months 
employed 
per year 
State 
revenue 
per capita 
State 
evangelical 
rate 
State 
citizen 
ideology 
State 
population 
- % black 
Ave. monthly welfare payment 1.0000             
Ave. monthly earned income -0.1204 1.0000           
No. months employed per year -0.0917 -0.0019 1.0000         
State revenue per capita 0.0669 -0.0374 -0.0743 1.0000       
State evangelical rate -0.2099 -0.0027 0.0165 -0.6336 1.0000     
State citizen ideology 0.1395 -0.0269 -0.0835 0.6960 -0.6913 1.0000   
State population - % black -0.1706 -0.0089 0.0468 0.0650 0.3288 -0.0612 1.0000 
41 
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Table 3. Differences in Average Monthly TANF Payments by Single Characteristic 
              
Average Monthly TANF Payments by Recipient Race       
              
Race Mean Std. Err.          
White 277.70 6.46         
Black 251.79 6.61         
  Coef. Std. Err.  t p-value     
T-test 25.91 8.74 2.97 0.004     
Percent Difference 9.33%           
              
Average Monthly TANF Payments by State Population - Percent Black   
              
  Mean Std. Err.          
Lower Black Population 321.26 7.24         
Higher Black Population 212.95 5.85         
  Coef. Std. Err.  t p-value     
T-test 108.31 9.00 12.04 <0.001     
Percent Difference 33.71%           
              
Average Monthly TANF Payments by Political Ideology     
              
  Mean Std. Err.          
More Conservative 234.40 5.64         
More Liberal 298.01 6.92         
  Coef. Std. Err.  t p-value     
T-test -63.61 8.50 -7.48 <0.001     
Percent Difference -27.14%           
              
Average Monthly TANF Payments by Evangelical Rate     
              
  Mean Std. Err.          
Fewer Evangelicals 316.85 6.85         
Greater Evangelicals 214.16 5.24         
  Coef. Std. Err.  t p-value     
T-test 102.68 7.94 12.93 <0.001     
Percent Difference 32.41%           
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